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Abstract
In this paper, we present the novel concept of fractional
public keys and an efﬁcient zero-round multi-party Difﬁe-
Hellman key agreement scheme that is based on fractional
public keys. Shared group keys are computed highly efﬁ-
ciently by using the fractional public keys of multiple partic-
ipants as exponents. The scheme provides therefore an efﬁ-
cient and elegant way of multi-party key agreement without
key establishment data transmissions. The presented cryp-
tographic scheme is collusion resistant to any number of
users.
1 Introduction
The simple and elegant two-party key agreement scheme
of Difﬁe and Hellman has to a large extent gotten the credit
for introducing the concept of public key cryptography. The
scheme has been the basis for a relatively large number
of cryptographic protocols. Since it lacks user authentica-
tion, a number of these schemes provide user authentica-
tion. Difﬁe-Hellman (DH) key agreement is also the ba-
sis for a number of group-oriented key agreement schemes
known as conference key agreement protocols. A common
characteristic of the schemes of this class of cryptographic
protocols is that they have a varying degree of efﬁciency in
terms of the number of rounds of message transmissions and
the number of computations and exponentiations for each
participant.
In this paper, we introduce a new approach for secure
group key computation that is in agreement with the Difﬁe-
Hellman key agreement paradigm, and that is mostly ben-
eﬁcial concerning efﬁciency and elegancy. In contrast to
using public keys computed as exponentiations, our scheme
uses public keys that are computed on a fractional form.
The fractional public keys are used as exponents for com-
puting group keys according to a modiﬁed version of the
Difﬁe-Hellman scheme. Since public user keys are used as
exponents, any number of public keys can be used simulta-
neously, meaning that the presented scheme is a true multi-
party shared key establishment scheme providing conve-
nient and efﬁcient group-oriented key agreement. Since
the value of the group key is based on the long-term public
keys of the participants, no data transmissions are required.
The scheme hence provides zero-round multi-party Difﬁe-
Hellman key agreement.
1.1 Related work
The concept of fractional public keys is inﬂuenced by the
cryptographic scheme proposed in [5]. In this paper, a col-
lusion resistant threshold cryptosystem is proposed by using
private user keys (user shares) that is computed on a fraction
form, where the numerator and denominator are secret poly-
nomials. As will be subsequently shown, fractional public
keys provide an efﬁcient secure group key computation.
Public key cryptography has been credited W. Difﬁe
and M. Hellman for their classical two-party key agree-
ment scheme from 1976 [4]. This scheme has since been
used as basis for great number of subsequent cryptographic
schemes. The lack of user and/or key authentication in
the original Difﬁe-Hellman (DH) scheme has caused the
proposal of many extended DH schemes. These are basi-
cally key agreement protocols with user authentication, and
some others are user authentication protocols. An interest-
ing overview over this family of cryptographic schemes can
be found in Chapter 5 of [2].
Although the DH scheme is a two-party protocol, some
authors have proposed generalizations of the DH scheme
for conference key agreement (CKA). An early unauthen-
ticated DH-CKA protocol was proposed by Ingemarsson et
al. [6]. This scheme has a relatively high overhead concern-
ing computation and the number of transmitted messages.
Steiner et al. [11] presented three protocols named GDH.1,
GDH.2 and GDH.3, which can be regarded as variations
of [6]. They are more efﬁcient concerning the number of
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computations and transmitted messages, but require more
rounds than [6].
Burmester and Desmedt [3] proposed an elegant multi-
party generalization of DH, which provides relatively high
efﬁciency, and requires only 2 rounds and 3 exponentia-
tions. Since each user broadcasts the message of the sec-
ond round to the others, it is highly suitably for wireless
networks.
Identity-based authenticated protocols have among oth-
ers been proposed by Koyoma and Otha [7, 8], and Saeednia
and Safavi-Naini whose DH-CKA protocol [10] is based on
the Burmester-Desmedt protocol [3]. Ateniese et al. [1]
extended the GDH.2 scheme [11] for user authentication.
Also see Chapter 6 of [2] for an excellent overview of DH-
CKA protocols and for comparisons.
2 Zero-round multi-party Difﬁe-Hellman
key agreement from fractional public keys
In this section, we present the new cryptographic group-
oriented key computation scheme. It consists of an initial-
ization phase requiring a trusted party providing each user
with a public/private long-term user key pair. The group
keys are computed as a function of the long-term user keys
of any given user coalition. Each user can therefore com-
pute group keys ofﬂine for any user coalition the given user
is a member of, without computing and transmitting key es-
tablishment messages.
Initialization. A Trusted Authority (TA) selects two large
secret primes p and q, where the product n = p · q is public.
According to the RSA public key cryptosystem [9], the TA
selects a public number e that is relatively prime to φ(n) =
(p − 1) · (q − 1), and computes a secret number d so that
e · d ≡ 1 (mod φ(n)). A public element α of high order in
Z
∗
n is also selected.
Let U denote a group of an arbitrary number of users,
where T ⊆ U denotes an arbitrary user subset. The cryp-
tosystem allows all members of T ⊆ U to securely com-
pute a shared secret group key. Hence, the scheme provides
secure multi-party key agreement with the advantage that
secret group keys can be computed without user interaction
and key establishment data transmissions.
Public/private user key computation. The TA generates
for each participant Pi ∈ U a random secret number xi ∈
Zφ(n). The TA selects for each Pi ∈ U a public number Ii,
so that (d + Ii) is relatively prime to φ(n). The public Ii
could for example represent a meaningful identity of Pi.
The TA computes the public key for Pi ∈ U as
yi =
xi
d + Ii
(mod φ(n))
and the corresponding private key
ki = αxi·d
M−1
(mod n)
where M denotes the maximum possible size of any user
coalition T . (The coalition max size must consequently be
the same as or less than the total number of users assigned
such long-term user keys.) The private key ki is transmitted
to Pi ∈ U through a secure channel.
Group key computation. At this stage, the participants of
a user coalition T ⊆ U compute the shared group key KT
according the following method:
Let IT,i = {j |Pj ∈ T\{Pi}}. Let t = |T |. Given a
polynomial
gi(d) =
∏
j∈IT,i
(
Ij + d
)
each participant Pi ∈ T computes the corresponding poly-
nomial coefﬁcients ci,j , 0 ≤ j ≤ t− 1, so that
gi(d) =
t−1∑
j=0
ci,j · dj
Note that the values of ci,j are independent of the value of
the secret d. It can also be noted as a matter of form that the
value of d is ﬁxed although gi(d) refers to a polynomial.
For j ∈ {0, . . . , t− 1}, let
wi,j = ke
M−1−j
i (mod n)
= (αxi·d
M−1
)e
M−1−j
(mod n)
= αxi·d
M−1·d−M+1+j (mod n)
= αxi·d
j
(mod n)
Each Pi ∈ T computes the secret group key KT for that
coalition T ⊆ U according to
KT =
( t−1∏
j=0
w
ci,j
i,j
)∏
j∈IT,i yj (mod n)
=
( t−1∏
j=0
αxi·d
j ·ci,j)
∏
j∈IT,i yj (mod n)
=
(
α
xi·
∏
j∈IT,i (d+Ij)
)∏
j∈IT,i
xj
d+Ij (mod n)
= α
∏
j∈IT xj (mod n)
where IT = {j |Pj ∈ T}.
3 Security analysis
In this section, we present the relevant security assump-
tions and security requirements of the presented scheme,
and then we show that the actual security of the scheme is
in agreement with the given security requirements.
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3.1 Security requirements
We assume that there exists a set U of an arbitrary num-
ber of users. A group key KT is computed as a function of
the long-term user keys of any user subset T ⊆ U . It can be
assumed an adversary A that is equivalent with a user coali-
tion A ⊆ U , where A ∩ T = ∅ for any coalition T ⊆ U .
Adversary assumptions. We assume that A may hold the
following information:
• The private user keys ki = αxi·dM−1 (mod n) for
each Pi ∈ A.
• The group keys KT∗ = α
∏
j|Pj∈T∗ xj (mod n) for
any T ∗ ⊆ U , where T ∗ = T .
• The public user key yi for each Pi ∈ U .
Security requirements. There is no communication required
to compute group keys KT , which are computed as a func-
tion of the long-term user keys of the user coalition T ⊆ U .
Data to be communicated conﬁdentially is encrypted by
means of a secure symmetric key cryptographic algorithm
using the secret group key as cryptokey. Assuming that the
symmetric key cryptographic algorithm used is secure, the
security of the scheme is based on the difﬁculty for an ad-
versary (or coalition of adversaries) A, to violate the fol-
lowing security requirements:
Security Requirement 1. Secrecy of private keys. It must
be computationally infeasible to obtain private user keys.
Security Requirement 2. Secrecy of group keys. No other
than the members of a given coalition T ⊆ U must be able
to compute the shared secret group key KT corresponding
to the long-term user keys of the given participants.
Security Requirement 3. Coalition resistance. It must be
prevented that any colluding user coalition A ⊆ U may vi-
olate the two former security requirements.
The security of the presented scheme is based on the se-
crecy of φ(n), d and xj (for any Pi ∈ U). We will now in
this regard present some relevant observations:
Observation 1. Secrecy of the secret parameters d and xj
(for any Pi ∈ U) concerning fractional public keys. The
public keys are computed according to
yi =
xi
d + Ii
(mod φ(n))
which corresponds to the equation
xi = yi · d + yi · Ii ⇔ yi · Ii = xi − yi · d
Since d and xi (for each yi) are unknown, the equation sys-
tem is underdeﬁned and can clearly not be solved, thereby
effectively prohibiting deduction of the secret xi and d.
Accordingly, two or more yj correspond likewise to un-
derdeﬁned linear equation systems, which hence cannot be
solved.
Observation 2a. Secrecy of the secret parameters d and xj
(for any Pi ∈ U) concerning private keys. Regarding the
private key ki = αxi·d
M−1
(mod n) (and hence the corre-
sponding wi,j = αxi·d
j
(mod n)), the secret d and xi are
accordingly protected due to the Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem.
Observation 2b. Secrecy of xj (for any Pj ∈ U) concerning
group keys. Regarding the group key KT = α
∏
j|Pj∈T xj
(mod n), the secret xi (for any Pi ∈ U) is accordingly
protected due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
Observation 2c. The secrecy of d given the public e and n
is in agreement with the RSA public key cryptosystem [9].
Observation 3. Let Wj = αw
j
. An adversary Pi ∈ A,
holding the private user key ki,0 can by means of the corre-
sponding public user key yi compute
W1 = αd = k
y−1i mod φ(n)
i,0 ·α−Ii = αxi·
d+Ii
xi ·α−Ii (mod n)
Given Wj−1, 1 < j < M , the following computations can
be carried recursively out:
Wj = αd
j
= ky
−1
i mod φ(n)
i,j ·W−Iij−1 (mod n)
= αxi·d
j · d+Iixi · α−dj−1·Ii (mod n)
This attack requires computation of inverses modulo
φ(n). Since n is a large composite number, computing φ(n)
is equivalent of solving the Factorization Problem, which is
known to be computationally infeasible.
3.2 Security requirements
We will now provide the security proofs of the security
requirements.
Proof of Security Requirement 1. Security of private keys.
According to Observations 1 and 2a-c, it is infeasible to de-
duce both d and xi (for any Pi ∈ U) from public/private
keys and group keys. Since the private keys are on the form
wi,j = αxi·d
j
, private keys can thus not be obtained by this
computation since d and xi (for any Pi ∈ U) are secret.
According to Observation 3, computation of Wj = αd
j
(mod n) (for 1 ≤ j ≤ M − 1) is prevented since φ(n) is
unknown. Accordingly, it is computationally infeasible to
obtain Wj = αd
j
given wi,j = αxi·d
j
(mod n) for any
Pi ∈ U due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
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It can be noted that given Wj and Wj+1 would allow
computation of private keys according to
wi,j =
(
Wj+1 ·W Iij
)yi (mod n)
=
(
αd
j ·(d+Ii)) xid+Ii = αxi·dj (mod n)
It is therefore computationally infeasible to compute private
keys by this computation without knowledge of the secret
φ(n), where computing φ(n) is equivalent of solving the
Factorization Problem. Thus, disclosure of private keys is
prevented, and the scheme is secure in agreement with Se-
curity Requirement 1.
Proof of Security Requirement 2. Group key security. A
group key can be computed given disclosure of the secret
d, xi (for any Pi ∈ U) and φ(n), since this would enable
computation of private user keys. In agreement with Secu-
rity Requirement 1, an adversary is prevented to obtain any
private key of users in T . The adversary is accordingly pre-
vented from using such a key to compute the corresponding
group key KT .
Let us assume that A possesses a group key KT∗ for any
T ∗ ⊆ U , T ∗ = T , and a group key KT∗∗ for any T ∗∗ ⊆
U , T ∗∗ = T , where T = T ∗ ∪ T ∗∗ and T ∗ ∩ T ∗∗ = ∅.
Computing KT given KT∗ and KT∗∗ is hence equivalent to
solving the Difﬁe-Hellman Problem, which is known to be
computationally infeasible. Thus, disclosure of group keys
is prevented, and the scheme is secure in agreement with
Security Requirement 2.
Proof of Security Requirement 3. Collusion resistance.
Regarding disclosure of numbers, where the difﬁculty of
achieving this based on a number theoretical problem like
the Factorization Problem or DLP, the number of collud-
ing participants does not affect the hardness of such prob-
lems. This leaves the problem of solving the linear equa-
tion system corresponding to a set of any number of public
user keys, as pointed out in Section 3.1, where the equa-
tion xi = yi · d + yi · Ii corresponds to the public key yi.
Accordingly, since two or more public keys yj for Pj ∈ U
correspond likewise to an underdeﬁned linear equation sys-
tem, it is not possible to solve such an equation system. The
scheme is thus collusion resistant to any number of collud-
ing parties. The scheme is therefore collusion resistant, and
the scheme is secure in agreement with Security Require-
ment 3.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented the novel concept of
fractional public keys and an efﬁcient zero-round multi-
party Difﬁe-Hellman key agreement scheme based on frac-
tional public keys. The fractional keys enable public keys to
be used as exponents, thereby allowing a novel variation of
Difﬁe-Hellman key agreement with no key data transmis-
sions.
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